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Abstract
Blockchain based systems allow various kinds of
financial transactions to be executed in a decentral-
ized manner. However, these systems often rely on
a trusted third party (oracle) to get correct informa-
tion about the real-world events, which trigger the
financial transactions. In this paper, we identify two
biggest challenges in building decentralized, trust-
less1 and transparent oracles. The first challenge
is acquiring correct information about the real-
world events without relying on a trusted informa-
tion provider. We show how a peer-consistency in-
centive mechanism can be used to acquire truthful
information from an untrusted and self-interested
crowd, even when the crowd has outside incentives
to provide wrong information. The second is a sys-
tem design and implementation challenge. For the
first time, we show how to implement a trustless
and transparent oracle in Ethereum. We discuss
various non-trivial issues that arise in implementing
peer-consistency mechanisms in Ethereum, suggest
several optimizations to reduce gas cost and pro-
vide empirical analysis.
1 Introduction
With the increasing popularity of the blockchain technology,
the implementation of commercial and governmental sys-
tems has witnessed a large shift towards distributed and de-
centralized approaches. In particular, the emergence of the
Ethereum platform has given rise to the development of sev-
eral applications, often referred to as decentralized apps or
DAPs, which aim to apply this latter principle to many areas
such as finance, education, intellectual property or govern-
ment. At the heart of these approaches lies the concept of
the smart contract, i.e., lines of code that contain the terms
of the agreement between the involved parties, which are au-
tomatically executed once triggered by events happening in
the real world. For example, consider the case of a web ser-
vice, which is typically dictated by a service level agreement
∗The two authors contributed equally.
1Trustless is a term increasingly used in the context of decentral-
ized and blockchain systems meaning not requiring trust.
(SLA) between the service provider and the clients. The SLA
can be coded into a smart contract between the involved par-
ties which will trigger an automatic payment upon detection
of a violation. For instance, if the service guarantees a re-
sponse time of at most 1 second with high probability, fre-
quent slower responses would trigger automatic compensa-
tion. An important issue here is, how to determine whether
the real-world event has actually happened. In the above ex-
ample, this means how to determine that the SLA has been
violated? We use the case of the web service only as a simple
running example but this is in fact a fundamental challenge in
developing information infrastructure for FinTech.
The need for trusted information about a real-world event
that triggers some conditional financial transactions arises in
applications ranging from insurance, banking, trade, gover-
nance and law etc. The entities responsible for acquiring such
data about the real-world events are called oracles. Exist-
ing solutions include Town Crier and Chainlink among oth-
ers. Traditionally, oracles are implemented using trusted third
party data sources responsible for acquiring the information.
However, besides the fact that such an approach is in conflict
with the decentralized nature of the blockchain technology, it
is also prone to problems such as trustworthiness and cost.
An alternative solution would be to appeal to the “wisdom
of the crowds” and ask the users themselves about the infor-
mation (for e.g., the quality of service received). The idea
has also been proposed for outcome resolution in decentral-
ized prediction markets like Augur and Gnosis. While this
approach is more decentralized in nature, it poses a signif-
icant challenge: the agents can not be relied on to provide
correct information. The task of eliciting information from
self-interested agents is one of the fundamental problems in
game theory, and has been extensively studied. In the center
of these investigations lies the literature on peer-consistency
mechanisms [Faltings and Radanovic, 2017]; these are game-
theoretic mechanisms that incentivize agents to report the in-
formation truthfully, even if the information is unverifiable.
In this paper, we propose the employment of peer-
consistency mechanisms for the design of trustless, decentral-
ized oracles. This seems like a natural choice, as the useful-
ness of the oracles is dependent on the quality of the supplied
information, which needs to be truthfully elicited from the
agents. However, this quest imposes two major challenges:
• For a peer-consistency mechanism to actually work, the
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agents must be convinced of its incentive properties,
contrary to the traditional case, where the implementa-
tion of the mechanism is done by a trusted third-party.
How can one implement the incentive scheme in a trans-
parent and trustless manner, what is the cost and how
can we optimize this cost?
• In many financial settings, agents also have incentives to
lie about their true observations and provide false infor-
mation. In the web service example, the clients would
have an incentive to always report “bad” response times,
in order for the conditions of the smart contract to be vi-
olated in their favor. How large do the incentives have
to be, to counteract the lying incentives, and is the ap-
proach economically feasible?
In this paper, we address the above questions. We summarise
our contributions below.
1. We design and implement INFOCHAIN, a completely de-
centralized peer-consistency based truthful information
collection system in Ethereum. We address the follow-
ing technical challenges in its implementation.
• Writing data and performing computation on
Ethereum’s Virtual Machine (EVM) is expensive.
Information providers must be compensated for
this cost, increasing the overall cost of informa-
tion acquisition. For the first time, we discuss
several non-trivial ways of implementing three
different peer-consistency mechanisms in Solidity
(Ethereum’s programming language) and empiri-
cally compare their costs.
• While transparency is a desired inherent feature of
blockchain, the peer-consistency mechanisms are
compromised if an agent can see the information
submitted by their “peers” before submitting their
own information. We propose to use a commit-
reveal protocol to address this challenge.
• In order to reduce computation complexity, peer-
consistency mechanisms use only one (or a few)
randomly selected peer(s) for every agent. How-
ever, if the random peer(s) can be predicted, the
agents get an opportunity to collude and the mech-
anisms can be compromised, and this risk is in-
creased by the transparency of blockchain. We
show that under reasonable assumptions, random
peer selection can still be implemented safely.
2. We analyze the settings when agents have outside incen-
tives to lie. We formally show that even in the presence
of such outside incentives peer-consistency can be used
to elicit the truth by choosing an appropriate constant to
scale the rewards. We show that normally the payments
required are a small fraction of the outside incentive.
1.1 Related Work
Many decentralized systems have been proposed for crowd-
sourcing and information trading [An et al., 2019; Xiong and
Xiong, 2019; Lu et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018] but none ad-
dresses the issue of providing quality based incentives for
information. In a recent and independent work, [Kong et
al., 2019] also use peer-consistency for trust-free data trad-
ing systems but the analysis in this theoretical paper focuses
on a secure multi-party computation protocol for rewarding
information that loses value if revealed. [Adler et al., 2018]
propose a system for a decentralized oracle but it requires a
“random assignment” of questions to agents, which has the
drawback that agents may be asked to answer questions that
they may have no information about.
The literature on peer-consistency is long and extensive
[Miller et al., 2005; Prelec, 2004; Waggoner and Chen, 2014;
Gao et al., 2016; Agarwal et al., 2017; Liu and Chen, 2017;
Goel and Faltings, 2019a; Goel and Faltings, 2019b].; we re-
fer the reader to [Faltings and Radanovic, 2017] for a detailed
exposition of the main results. Most relevant to ours are the
results related to incentives which are dependent on the out-
come, e.g., [Chakraborty and Das, 2016; Chen et al., 2011;
Freeman et al., 2017]. These differ from our theoretical con-
tributions in the fact that they only apply to the specific do-
main of prediction markets.
2 Infochain
To collect truthful information from self-interested agents, we
propose a completely decentralized, transparent and trustless
system called Infochain. Infochain enables information re-
questers to post questions, which can be selected by informa-
tion providers (agents). The questions can be, for example, of
the following form: “Is the responseTime of web service
W less than 1 second?”. Once the agents submit informa-
tion for the questions they select to answer, their payments
in Ether are processed by a smart contract. All the collected
information and payments are stored on a public blockchain
to ensure transparency and immutability.
Peer-consistency. A crucial step in eliciting trustworthy in-
formation from self-interested agents is aligning their incen-
tives with honest behavior. Unfortunately, a naive incentive
mechanism may invite free riders who submit random infor-
mation. Designing truthful incentive mechanisms is a hard
problem when there is no way to verify the correctness of the
information. This issue has been addressed by game theo-
retic peer-consistency mechanisms [Faltings and Radanovic,
2017]. The broad idea in these mechanisms is to reward the
agents by “matching” the information provided by multiple
agents, while discouraging any collusion. The state of the
art peer-consistency mechanisms guarantee that truth-telling
strategy is the highest paying equilibrium and other equilib-
ria are less profitable. We consider three fundamental peer-
consistency mechanisms in this paper.
1. The Output Agreement (OA) Mechanism [Waggoner
and Chen, 2014]: This is perhaps the simplest of all
peer-consistency mechanisms. In the OA mechanism,
an agent gets a reward of 1 unit only if her answer for
a question matches the answer of her peer for the same
question. The reward of the agent for a question is the
average over the rewards earned by matching with all
peers. The final reward of the agent is the average of her
rewards from all the questions answered by her.
2. The Dasgupta and Ghosh (DG) Mechanism [Das-
gupta and Ghosh, 2013]: In the DG mechanism, an
Infochain Smart Contract
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1 Information requester deploys the smart 
contract (with required 
budget and deposit) and 
posts questions.
2 Information providers select questions to answer.
3
Information providers submit 
answer commitments with 
deposits. 4
Info providers reveal 
answers and secret keys.
Payments and deposits of 
requester and providers 
are processed.
Figure 1: Infochain Overview
agent gets a reward of 1 unit if her answer for a question
matches the answer of her peer for the same question
but also gets a penalty of 1 unit if her answers match
the answers of the peer on non-common questions. The
DG mechanism requires that two agents, who are peers
of one another, must also have some non-common ques-
tions that are answered by one of them but not by both.
The final reward is calculated by averaging as described
in the OA mechanism. The Correlated Agreement
mechanism [Shnayder et al., 2016] is a generalization of
the DG mechanism and exhibits similar computations.
3. The Peer Truth Serum for Crowdsourc-
ing(PTSC) [Radanovic et al., 2016]: In PTSC,
the reward of an agent i for a question is calculated
using the following formula:α ·
(1y=y′
Ri(y)
− 1
)
if Ri(y) 6= 0
0 if Ri(y) = 0
where y is the answer submitted by the agent and y′ is
the answer submitted by her peer for the same question.
α is a strictly positive scaling constant.
Ri(y) = numi(y)/
∑
y¯∈{0,1}
numi(y¯), where numi(y) is
a function that counts occurrences of y in the answers
of all agents (except i) across all questions. The final
reward is calculated by averaging discussed earlier.
Traditionally, these mechanisms are implemented by a cen-
tralized trusted third party. Implementing them in Infochain,
which doesn’t assume any centralization or trust, is challeng-
ing. In the following subsections, we address the main im-
plementation and theoretical challenges. An overview of In-
fochain is provided in Figure 1.
2.1 Commit-Reveal Protocol
Transparency is an inherent feature of blockchain. Thus, all
the information submitted by an agent is visible to all others.
The peer-consistency mechanisms guarantee their incentive
compatibility assuming that an agent can only form a belief
about what her peers are going to report but doesn’t know the
actual report of peers. We ensure this in Infochain by making
the agents follow a commit-reveal protocol:
1. Commit: An agent writes her commitment
keccak256(y, k) on the chain, where y is the agent’s
answer for a given question and k is her secret key.
2. Reveal: Once all agents who have selected a ques-
tion, have finished submitting their commitments for the
question or the commitment phase expires, they can re-
veal their respective secret keys and answers. If the com-
mitment of an agent matches her revealed answer, the
answer is written on the chain, otherwise it is discarded.
2.2 Cost Optimizations
Performing computations on Ethereum’s Virtual Machine
(EVM) remains an expensive affair. Computation costs on
EVM are roughly 108 times higher than AWS2. [Ryan, 2017]
provides a good summary about the costs of basic arithmetic
operations and writing operations for different data types.
Agents who provide information must be compensated for
this cost, increasing the overall cost of information acquisi-
tion. We discuss below several non-trivial ways of imple-
menting three different peer-consistency mechanisms in So-
lidity so that the costs can be minimized.
1. Optimizing Writing Cost: To minimize the costs of
writing on the chain, agents on Infochain combine mul-
tiple answers in the form of a bit vector. This is mo-
tivated by two observations. First, the answers are re-
vealed simultaneously and thus, they do not require sep-
arate commitments. Second, the EVM operates on 256
bit words, thus a single bit vector is much cheaper to
write than other formats.
Proposition 1. With the above scheme, each 256-bit
commitment can contain up to 42 answers.
Proof. Given a hash function H with a 3k bit output,
to commit the k bit message m, Alice generates a ran-
dom k bit string S and sends Bob H(S||m). The prob-
ability that any S ′, m′ exist where m′ 6= m such that
H(S ′||m′) = H(S||m) is ≈ 2−k. The size of the mes-
sage sent is limited to one third the size of the output of
the hashing function, thus 85 bits. Each answer requires
2 bits: the first determines if the question was answered
and the second is the answer. Therefore each commit-
ment can contain 42 answers.
2https://aws.amazon.com/blockchain/
(a) Writing Cost Optimization (b) Comput. Cost Optimization (c) Comparing Mechanisms (d) Random Peer Selection (DG)
Figure 2: Experimental Results
This optimization helps both commit and reveal phases.
2. Optimizing Computation Cost: To reduce the cost of
computing the rewards, a set of so-called intermediary
values is introduced. These values naturally appear at
intermediary states of reward computation. They will be
precomputed and reused for each agent. What these in-
termediary values are, depends on the peer-consistency
mechanism. This approach allows for the computa-
tion to traverse the data a minimum number of times.
Since all rewards are computed at the same time, these
intermediary values don’t need to be written on the
blockchain and can be kept in memory instead.
For an example, consider the PTSC mechanism, which
requires relative frequency Ri(y) of the value y while
excluding the answer given by agent i. This quantity
need not be calculated from scratch for every agent or
when every new answer is submitted and neither it is
required to be written on the chain. The intermediary
values (for e.g. running average) can be kept in memory
and used to calculate or update Ri(y) as required.
2.3 Random Peer Selection
In peer-consistency, we can use only one or a few randomly
selected peers for reward calculation instead of all peers.
This is because, in expectation, the rewards of the agents re-
main unchanged and thus, the mechanisms with randomly se-
lected peers also offer the same incentive compatibility (ex-
cept that the variance in rewards increases). This is an in-
teresting tradeoff between computation cost and variance in
rewards. However, random peer selection on blockchain is
subtle mainly due to the fact that nothing on the chain is a
“secret”, including the seed for random number generation.
If random peers can be known in advance, it may increase the
risk of collusion between the agents compromising the incen-
tive compatibility of the mechanisms. In Infochain, we use
the block timestamps as well as the mining difficulty level as
the seed. This avoids using any trusted third party for random
peer selection. The approach works under the assumption that
the miners will not try to cheat the smart-contract, which is a
reasonable assumption given that the miners have no incen-
tive to do so since they risk losing their mining rewards. The
assumption can be violated in extreme scenarios where the fi-
nancial activity on Infochain (for e.g. the incentive amounts)
exceed the mining rewards.
2.4 Negative Payments
The DG mechanism and the PTSC allow negative payments,
which is implemented in Infochain by making agents submit
refundable deposits. Information requesters also deposit the
payment budget and an additional refundable deposit. Any
outstanding deposits of the agents and the requester are re-
turned after the payments and computations costs are settled.
3 Experiments
We now discuss the results of some experiments performed
on Infochain. The performance measure of interest in this
discussion will be the total amount of gas used. Gas is a unit
measuring the computational work of running transactions or
smart contracts in the Ethereum network and is a good proxy
for the cost in USD. Infochain has been deployed and tested
on the Ropsten Test Network, one of the commonly used pub-
lic testing framework for Ethereum smart contracts. To have
no limitations in terms of gas, the results reported in this pa-
per have been generated on a local instance of Ethereum.
Dataset Description. For this experiment, we used a public
dataset [Zheng et al., 2014] containing real-world quality of
service evaluation from 339 trusted agents for 5,825 web ser-
vices. The agents observe the response time (in seconds) of
the web-services. The real valued observations were placed
into two categories (“good” and “bad”), in order to fit them
to our binary observation setting. We treated a response time
of at most 1 second as “good” and the rest as “bad”. This
dataset acts as the ground truth data that the information re-
quester is interested in eliciting from self-interested agents.
We simulated agent behavior as follows: 50% of the agents
report truthfully, 25% report randomly (i.e. independent of
the ground truth) and the rest report in an adversarial way
(i.e. opposite of the truth).
Results. In Figure 2a, we show the reduction in writing cost
due to the proposed optimization discussed in Section 2.2 as
compared to the baseline implementation (without any pro-
posed optimizations). Tasks in the figures refer to the ques-
tions that the agents answer. As expected, the reduction
becomes more significant as agents answer more questions
since the optimization can pack more and more answers into
a single write operation. It may be worth noting that the opti-
mization doesn’t make writing cost independent of the num-
ber of answers as the figure may suggest. Since the number
of questions in the figure doesn’t exceed 42, the cost remains
same as number of questions increase. Figure 2b shows the
reduction in computation cost due to the proposed optimiza-
tions with varying number of agents and number of questions
per agent. The figure was plotted based on the numbers ob-
tained with the PTSC mechanism but we observed a similar
trend for the OA and the DG mechanisms. We next compare
the cost of the three mechanisms in Figure 2c. While the OA
mechanism and the PTSC mechanism have similar cost, the
DG mechanism is more costly. This is due to the fact that DG
mechanism involves more operations, particularly for keep-
ing track of questions that are not shared between agents. Fi-
nally, Figure 2d shows the effect of using randomly selected
peers for reward computation in the DG mechanism. We note
that there may be multiple ways to implement sampling with-
out replacement; for e.g., 1) randomly select a peer, check
if it is already in the list of previously selected peers and re-
peat; and 2) sample from the list of not selected peers, update
the list of not selected peers and repeat. The first method is
not suitable for blockchains as there is no upper bound on the
number of necessary random selections and thus the trans-
action may run out of gas. The results presented here cor-
respond to the second method. As shown in Figure 2d, the
cost is guaranteed to reduce if we randomly select only one
peer per agent. But when multiple peers are to be selected
(which is required to reduce variance in rewards), the cost
may increase to a level higher than the cost of using all peers
without any random selection. The reason for this is that as
we select more random peers, the cost of implementing ran-
dom sampling exceeds the cost of simple implementation of
just using all the peers.
4 Countering Lying Incentives
In the previous section, we explained how some popular peer-
consistency mechanisms can be implemented in Ethereum,
which is an essential step towards the design of decentral-
ized oracles. The other crucial part is to ensure that they
provide the incentives to the agents to report their observa-
tions truthfully, even if their inherent incentives are towards
the other direction. To make this more concrete, consider the
example of the the web service, mentioned in the Introduc-
tion. Clearly, the agents have an incentive to report “bad ser-
vice” so that they can be compensated by the service provider.
We will show how one of the peer-consistency mechanisms
of Infochain, the PTSC mechanism can actually be tuned to
counter these outside incentives. We remark that while the
mechanism is known to be able to handle constant extra in-
centives [Radanovic et al., 2016], like the cost of effort, it was
not known whether it can be used for incentives that depend
on the outcome and the reports of the other agents. We estab-
lish such a result in this section, and we quantify the savings
that the employment of the mechanism achieves, compared to
the case of not applying any peer-consistency.
Formally, we consider settings in which there is a large
number of questions to be answered, and each agent selects
and answers a few of them. The answer space is defined by a
binary variable, e.g., “good service” or “bad service”. We will
use xi ∈ {0, 1} to denote the (private) observation of agent i
and yi ∈ {0, 1} to denote its report. Since agents are rational,
it might not be the case that yi = xi but rather, yi will be
some function of xi. If yi = xi we will say that the agent is
being truthful. Another important case is when yi = 0 (re-
gardless of xi), where 0 denotes “bad service”. The outcome
oq for a question q is defined as the fraction of the n agents
who reported 0 as their feedback on that question. Based on
the announced outcome, the agents (who submitted 0 as feed-
back) are issued a refund payment c · oq , i.e., proportional to
the value of the outcome.
Intuitively, the outcome is determined by the agents that
claimed to be dissatisfied with the service and asked for a
refund. In the web service example, this corresponds to the
fraction of agents who report that the response time of the
service was higher than the guarantee. It should be obvious
that if we do not provide any extra incentives (i.e., in the ab-
sence of peer-consistency), every rational agent would report
yi = 0, in order to get compensated. We will prove that with
the appropriate use of PTSC, one can make sure that being
truthful is the (only) best option for an agent, assuming that
other agents are also truthful. In game-theoretic terms, we
will prove that being truthful is a strict equilibrium.3 This
will be achieved via an appropriate choice of the scaling con-
stant α in the definition of PTSC.
We have analyzed similar settings in more detail in another
paper [Goel et al., 2020] assuming that every agent who sub-
mit a feedback is eligible for a refund. The following analysis
in this paper is for a special case when only agents who sub-
mit 0 as their feedback are eligible for a refund.
Beliefs and Belief Correlation. The most important con-
stituents of the peer-consistency framework are the agents’
beliefs about the observations of their peers. We will let
Pi(xp = x
′), for x′ ∈ {0, 1}, denote agent i’s (prior) belief
about a randomly selected peer p’s observation xp on a ques-
tion being x′. A standard assumption in the literature is that
the priors are fully mixed, i.e Pi(xp = x′) > 0,∀x′ ∈ {0, 1}.
After the agent makes a private observation xi for a question,
she updates her belief (posterior) about her peer’s observa-
tion on that question only, to Pi(xp = x′|xi = x). Given the
beliefs of the agents, the following quantity will be useful:
β = min
i
(Pi(xp = 1|xi = 1)
Pi(xp = 1)
− Pi(xp = 0|xi = 1)
Pi(xp = 0)
)
Intuitively, the quantity β measures the correlation strength
between the observations of agents. The assumption that
β > 0 is standard in the literature of peer-consistency (e.g.,
see [Jurca and Faltings, 2005; Witkowski and Parkes, 2012])
and in fact, it is a prerequisite for the PTSC mechanism to
guarantee truthful behavior. The assumption is rather obvious
3Since the agents only have subjective beliefs about the obser-
vations of others, the appropriate equilibrium concept here is the
subjective equilibrium [Witkowski and Parkes, 2012].
in binary answer settings: if an agent observes 1, that can only
increase her posterior belief about her stochastically-relevant
peer also observing 1. We will make the same assumption
here, and we will use β to quantify the scaling constant α that
we need to use in PTSC, to overcome the lying incentives.
We will also need the following quantity:
γ = max
i
Pi(xp = 0|xi = 1),
which measures the maximum over the posterior beliefs of
any agent about her peer’s observation being 0, given that her
own observation was 1.
Theorem 1. There is a value of the scaling constant α for
which PTSC has a strict truthful equilibrium, even when
agents have outside incentives. In particular, this is guar-
anteed when
α >
c · (1 + (n− 1)γ)
n · β
Note that the scaling constant α decreases with increasing n.
4.1 Making PTSC Profitable
While we have shown in the above theorem that agents can
be incentivized to be truthful with a large-enough choice of
the scaling constant of PTSC, the question that still remains
is whether this is economically profitable. Are the rewards of
peer-consistency so big that we end up paying more to agents,
compared to what we would have paid as refund, if they all
simply reported yi = 0? We answer this question below.
First, we quantify the payments of PTSC.
Theorem 2. The total expected PTSC payment per agent that
is enough to elicit truthful information in the presence of out-
side incentives is given by α.
We note that this is not immediate from Theorem 1, as the
expected payment issued for each agent is
α · E
[1y=y′
Ri(y)
− 1
]
where expectation is taken with respect to the actual random
variation in the true observations of the agents (for e.g. ran-
dom variation in the reception of the service). The theorem
follows from the fact that this quantity in expectation can be
upper bounded by 1.
Due to α’s inverse dependence on n, the payments get
smaller with increasing n. To provide some concrete intu-
ition, we remark that the PTSC payment will generally only
be a small fraction of the maximum outside incentive R. For
a concrete example, consider a web service that provides a
good service 95% of the time; this is a realistic assumption
for many web-services that stay in business. Furthermore, let
us assume a small correlation in the agents’ observations such
that P (xp = 1|xi = 1) = P (xi = 1) + 0.01, and similarly
for P (xp = 0|xi = 0). In this case, the PTSC payments per
agent are just 1.2% of the refund payments c even when there
are just 10 agents answering a question; the fraction quickly
decreases to 0.7% of c when there are 25 agents.
In many applications, the same entity is responsible for
paying the refunds as well as the PTSC payment. For exam-
ple, in the web service case, the service provider is respon-
sible for collecting truthful data and also paying the refund
based on the collected payment. For such cases, we measure
the relative saving of this entity as:
relative saving:
nc− P
nc
,
where P is the total payment (PTSC payments + outcome
dependent payment) under the scheme to all the agents.
One might feel inclined to believe that if agents were not
strategic, we could hope for a saving of 100%. However, this
will be true only if the outcome is 0, when the service is “bad”
0% of the time, whereas in reality that may not be the case as
we show in the next proposition. We will let P (1) denote the
probability that a report on the platform is 1.
Proposition 2. If agents reported truthfully ignoring the pos-
sible refund payments, the platform could make an expected
relative saving of up to P (1)(2− P (1)).
This is of course an ideal case; in the presence of rational
agents, we quantify the saving of PTSC as follows.
Theorem 3. The expected relative saving in payments made
in the truth-telling equilibrium is at least
P (1)(2− P (1))− α
c
,
where P (1) is the actual probability of a randomly selected
report being 1 in the truthful equilibrium.
Note that as long as the condition P (1)(2 − P (1)) > α/c
is satisfied, the lower bound on the saving is actually a pos-
itive number. Again, due to α’s inverse dependence on n,
the savings get bigger with increasing n and are also always
guaranteed to be positive given sufficient value of n.
We refer the reader to [Goel et al., 2020] for a discussion
of the undesired equilibrium where all agents report 0, and
how it can be eliminated when there exists a strictly posi-
tive fraction of honest agents. Another simple way to elimi-
nate this undesired equilibrium is to keep open the possibil-
ity of a trusted verification if the fraction of agents report-
ing 0 exceeds a certain threshold. If independent verification
doesn’t confirm poor service, agents who reported 0 can suf-
fer a penalty that outweighs the refunds by a large margin. A
credible threat of such verification is enough to deter rational
agents from playing the undesired equilibrium.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a novel system called Infochain
that implements decentralized, trustelss and transparent or-
acles on the Ethereum blockchain. Contrary to earlier pro-
posals on decentralized crowdsourcing systems, Infochain
addresses the issue of truthfulness by implementing game-
theoretic peer-consistency mechanisms. We prove that peer-
consistency mechanisms can be be used to elicit truthful
information even when the agents have outside incentives
to misreport the information. For the first time, we dis-
cussed issues that arise in implementing these mechanisms
in blockchain. The paper also presents an important new cri-
terion for comparing or evaluating these mechanisms by their
implementation complexity on the Ethereum blockchain.
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